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Abstract  
This article examines how corporate insolvencies in China, the 
second largest economy, are handled under the current 
legislation, the China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of 2006. 
Relying on the fresh empirical data arising from the first ten years 
on the use of China’s three insolvency procedures, 
reorganization, composition and liquidation, this article reveals 
the huge gap between the law in the books and the law in action, 
arguing that the implementation of this law in China perhaps has 
not achieved the legislative objectives. The constitutional and 
institutional weaknesses affecting the application of this law are 
analyzed.  
Key Words: China, Insolvency, Bankruptcy, Reorganization, 
Composition and Liquidation.  




In 2006, China promulgated its first rescue-oriented Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law of 2006 (the EBL 2006) with the objectives of facilitating 
more corporate reorganizations, establishing a market-based corporate 
insolvency profession and of enhancing cross-border insolvencies. Given 
that more than ten years have passed after the new law became effective 
since 2007, time seems to be ripe to investigate whether the 
implementation of this law is a success or a failure. Bearing in mind this 
question, this article particularly sheds light on the use of the three 
corporate insolvency procedures, reorganization, composition and 
liquidation under this law and finds that unfortunately little improvement 
has been made in the past decade.  
To explain why such a conclusion is reached, the article uses three 
parts to untangle the Chinese corporate bankruptcy law both in the books 
and in action. Part 1 gives a brief account about the history of China’s 
bankruptcy law. Part 2 considers the main features of the EBL 2006 and 
examines the extent to which its legislative goals have been achieved. Part 
3 analyses the three insolvency procedures, reorganization, composition 
and liquidation, under this law, investigating the contrast between law and 
reality. Some policy reflections are placed at the conclusion.  
II. HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
CHINA 
 
China’s first bankruptcy law can be traced back to 1905, when the 
Royal Court of the Qing Dynasty enacted the Bankruptcy Law of 1905,1 
which regulates the bankruptcy of both individuals and companies. 2 But 
this law was unexpectedly revoked in 1907 for unknown reasons.3 Almost 
 
* Lecturer of law at School of Law, University of Leeds, Email: z.zhang2@leeds.ac.uk. 
The author wishes to thank the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for 
funding this study under the grant ES/P004040/1 entitled “boosting growth through 
strengthening investor and creditor protection in China.” The views expressed in this article 
are of the author’s own and do not represent the funding agency.  
1 XU Lizhi, Qing Mo Shangshi Lifa Yianjiu [Commercial Legislation in the Late Qing 
Dynasty] (Research Paper of the China Academy of Social Science Institute of Law) 
https://iolaw.org.cn/showNews.aspx?id=2367.  
2 CHANG NIEH-YUN, TRANSLATION OF THE CHINESE BANKRUPTCY CODE OF 1905 1-17 
(1907).  
3 Chen Xiahong, Jingdai Zhongguo De Pochan Fazhi Jiqi Mingyun [The Modern China’s 
Bankruptcy Laws and Their Fates], 28 Zhenfa Luntang [Tribune of Political Science and 
Law] 57, 60 (2010).  
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three decades later, in 1935, the China Legislative Yuan, the parliament of 
the republic government led by the Kuomintang Nationalist Party, 
promulgated the China Bankruptcy Law of 1935; unlike the 1905 
bankruptcy law under which a bankruptcy procedure is mainly managed 
by a civil society, a local chamber of commerce, the 1935 Bankruptcy Law 
designates law courts to supervise the bankruptcy of both individuals and 
companies.4  
Little is known about the extent to which the 1935 Bankruptcy Law 
was implemented, but one thing is certain: China was then in the military 
chaos between the republicans and the communist rebels. After the 
communists finally won the civil war in 1949, all legislations enacted by 
the republic government, including the 1935 bankruptcy law, were scraped 
by the new regime in the mainland of China, although most of these laws 
are still in operation in the Taiwan Island to which the republicans 
retreated.5  
After the communist party took control of China since 1949, perhaps 
because of the planned economy as well as the communist ideology,6 using 
bankruptcy law to solve business failures seemed to be unnecessary, and 
even some communist ideologues believe they could build a bankruptcy-
free economy.7 Apparently, this was unrealistic, as late Mr. Cao Siyuan, a 
leading figure in China’s central government in charge of drafting the first 
socialist bankruptcy law, argues that bankruptcy is inevitable in both 
socialist and capitalist economies.8 It is not a surprise that, under the 
pressure to deal with money-losing state-owned enterprises (SOEs),9 
China, early in the 1980s, eventually resumed the effort to make a 
bankruptcy law, which resulted in the promulgation of the China 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of 1986 (the EBL 1986).10  
Given the dominant state sector in the Chinese economy when the 
EBL 1986 was made, this law only applies to SOEs.11 It is noteworthy that 
the real policy intention of enacting the EBL 1986 is arguably not to 
 
4 Article 2 of the China Bankruptcy Law of 1935.  
5 Chen Xiahong, Mingguo Pochanfa De Qicaozhai [The Draftsman of the 1935 China 
Bankruptcy Law], Fazhi Ribao [Legal Daily] Oct. 27, 2016, 11.  
6 Cao Siyuan, Shi Lun Shixing Qiye Pochanfa De Biyao Xing [The Necessity of Enforcing 
a Law of Bankruptcy in China], 5 Gai Ge [Reform] 25, 26 (1985).  
7 Cao Siyuan, Guanyu Zhiding Pochanfa De Jiangyi [Proposal to Make a Bankruptcy Law 
in China], 11 Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences] 42 (1984).  
8 Chen Jianfu, The Making of an Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in the PRC, 25 Law Context: 
A Socio-Legal Journal 77, 78 (2007).  
9 Carsten A Holz, Economic Reforms and State Sector Bankruptcy in China, 166 China 
Quarterly 342, 343 (2001).  
10 Peng Xiaohua, Characteristics of China’s First Bankruptcy Law, 28 Harv. Int’l L. J. 373 
(1987).  
11 Article 2 of the EBL 1986.  
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liquidate inefficient and bankrupt SOEs as well as not to protect 
creditors,12 rather the Chinese decision-makers aimed to use this law to 
warn SOEs to operate more efficiently.13 The EBL 1986 has two 
bankruptcy procedures, reorganization and liquidation. As noted by 
Professor Wang Weiguo, reorganization under this law is probably never 
used in practice,14 partly because of its procedural absurdity.15 Although 
several thousands of enterprise bankruptcy liquidation cases in total were 
dealt with by the Chinese courts following the promulgation of this law 
before the EBL 2006 was enacted, first, over half of these cases were 
actually to liquidate so-called collectively-owned enterprises,16 which are 
managed either by local government or by their parent SOEs, and second, 
the bankruptcy of most failed SOEs was handled by the government 
through administrative channels.17 
Arguably, to make the Chinese enterprise bankruptcy law look more 
inclusive, or perhaps to alleviate the criticism that SOEs and other 
enterprises are treated unequally at least in theory, when drafting the China 
Civil Procedure Law of 1991, the China People’s Congress inserted a 
chapter on the bankruptcy for non-SOE enterprises, including private and 
foreign-invested ones, Chapter 19, into this law.18 Similar to the EBL 
1986, the bankruptcy chapter in the Civil Procedure Law of 1991 also has 
two major bankruptcy procedures, reorganization and liquidation. But this 
chapter shares the same weakness with the EBL 1986: both are overly 
skeleton and considerably vague.19 This led to some commenting that the 
Chinese bankruptcy law is more like a policy statement rather than a law 
full of details intended to be used in practice.20 Up until then, at least on 
the statutory books, it seems that China has fully established the 
 
12 Douglass G Boshkoff & Yongxin Song, China’s New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation 
and Brief Introduction, 61 Am. Bankr. L. J. 359, 361 (1987).  
13 CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International and Investment Corp. [2005] HKEC 
1180.  
14 Weiguo Wang, Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes in China, A Comparative Survey, 
9 Aust. J. Corp. L. 234, 238 (1998).  
15 Michael Minor & Karen J Stevens-Minor, China’s Emerging Bankruptcy Law, 22 Int’l 
Law.1217, 1221 (1988).  
16 Li Shuguang, Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years, 3 Harv. Asia 
Q.1 (2006) .  
17 Weiguo Wang & Charles Booth, ‘Study on Alternative Approaches for Debt 
Restructuring of Enterprises in China’ (Report of the Project on ‘Debt Restructuring of 
Enterprise from the State Economy and Trade Commission of China) 29-30.  
18 Chapter 19 of the China Civil Procedure Law 1991.  
19 Michael Minor & Karen J Stevens-Minor, China’s Emerging Bankruptcy Law, 22 Int’l 
Law.1217, 1220 (1998).  
20 Donald C Clarke, ‘China, Creating a Legal System for a Market Economy’ (Asian 
Development Bank 2007) 7.  
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bankruptcy law system for enterprises in all ownerships, although China 
has not yet made a bankruptcy law for individuals since.21  
As mentioned before, in spite of an inclusive bankruptcy system on 
the statute books, translating the law into reality remained a formidable 
challenge; in general, both bankruptcy laws were only occasionally used 
by local government, through local courts, to liquidate enterprises that 
were state- or collectively-owned,22 by contrast, for private companies, the 
bankruptcy law was virtually not available.23  
Apparently, the dire situation of the implementation of the bankruptcy 
law did not catch up with China’s unprecedented economic growth 
especially after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 as well as the rapid 
expansion of the Chinese private economies;24 the calls for an effective 
corporate bankruptcy system from inside China and outside grew louder,25 
and this resulted in the promulgation of a unified enterprise bankruptcy 
law, the EBL 2006, years after China was admitted to the WTO.26 Many 
believe that China enacted the modern EBL 2006 in an effort to provide 
an orderly exit for failed businesses and to protect creditors,27 but some 
doubt that the promulgation of the EBL 2006 might superficially serve as 
a legislative gesture to impress China’s WTO partners, only.28  
III. MAJOR FEATURES OF THE CHINA ENTERPRISE 
BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 2006 
 
In fact, China’s endeavor to revamp its enterprise bankruptcy law 
began as early as in 1994,29 and twelve years later it finally bore fruit: The 
 
21 Haizheng Zhang & Xiaohe Tan, ‘Bankruptcy Petition and Acceptance’ in CHINA’S NEW 
ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW: CONTEXT, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 76 (Rebecca 
Parry, Yongqian Xu and Haizheng Zhang eds., 2010).  
22 Shuguang Li, Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years, 3 Harv. Asia 
Q. 1 (2006).  
23 Sheryl Miller, Institutional Impediments to the Enforcement of China’s Bankruptcy 
Laws, 8 Int’l Legal Persp. 187, 191 (1996).  
24 Joseph Kahn, ‘World Trade Organization Admits China, Amid Doubts’ New York Times 
(New York 11 November 2001) A16.  
25 United States Trade Representative, ‘2016 Report to Congress on China’s WTO 
Compliance’ (January 2017) 170.  
26 Tom Young, Enterprising Reform: China’s New Bankruptcy Law Represents More Than 
Comfort for Creditors, 26 Int’l Financial L. Rev. 60 (2007).  
27 OECD, CHINA, DEFINING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE 53 
(2009).  
28 Campbell Korff & Xinhong Liu, Why China’s Insolvency Regime Must Improve, 21 Int’l 
Financial L. Rev. 33, 35 (2002).  
29 Weiguo Wang, Corporate Governance and the Draft Bankruptcy Law of China, 17 Aust. 
J. Corp. L. 111, 112 (2004).  
2020 RESOLVING CORPORATE INSOLVENCIES IN CHINA 375 
 
EBL 2006 was passed by the China People’s Congress Standing 
Committee, the executive branch of the Chinese parliament, on 27 August 
2006, taking effect from 1 June 2007.30 In the course of drafting the EBL 
2006, the lawmakers studied the bankruptcy law from a number of 
jurisdictions, including the USA, UK, France and Germany; and it is fair 
to say that the American Chapter 11, to a large extent, helped reshape the 
EBL 2006.31 But the lawmakers, it seems, did not effectively consult their 
own business people when deliberating this law, which is a key 
constitutional defect of the Chinese law-making. Compared with the 
previous bankruptcy statutes, however, the EBL 2006 marks a significant 
step forward on a number of fronts.  
First, the EBL 2006 is the first rescue-oriented bankruptcy law in 
China. It comprises three substantial chapters, chapters 8 on 
reorganization, 9 on composition and 10 on liquidation; the order of the 
three chapters, arguably, reflects the intention of the Congress to prioritize 
the use of reorganization.32 If this is true, it may rather ironically expose 
the naivety of these lawmakers, since the primary goal of a bankruptcy 
law, arguably, is to liquidate inefficient and bankrupt businesses.33 
Unfortunately, at least from 2007 to 2015, the new rescue procedure under 
the EBL 2006 was only occasionally used – in most years less than 100 
reorganization cases can be identified in China – at the request of local 
government, to rehabilitate some large companies in China,34 and even it 
is safe to say that the new corporate reorganization procedure is virtually 
not available for businesses in practice, mainly due to the weak rule of law 
in the country. Chinese law courts routinely ignore the reorganization 
judicial demands from desperate businesses.  
To promote corporate rescues, under the EBL 2006 Article 2, a 
company that is bankrupt or is likely to be bankrupt can enter into the 
voluntary reorganization procedure, which means that an early rescue can 
be attempted at a time when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy 
rather than is already in a bankruptcy trouble,35 but this Article falls short 
 
30 The preface of the EBL 2006.  
31 Weiguo Wang, Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes, 9 Aust, J. Corp. L. 234 (1998).  
32 Zou Hailin, Woguo Qiye Zaishen Chenxu De Zhidu Fengxi He Shiyu [China’s Corporate 
Reorganisation Procedure: Theories and Practice], 25 Zhengfa Luntan [Tribune of Political 
Science and Law] 48, 50-1 (2007).  
33 Bruce G Carruthers & Terence C Halliday, Institutionalizing Creative Destruction: 
Predictable and Transparent Bankruptcy Law in the Wake of the East Asian Financial 
Crisis, in MEREDITH JUNG-EN WOO (ED), NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN 
EAST ASIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 244 (2007).  
34 ZHANG ZINIAN, CORPORATE REORGANISATIONS IN CHINA: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER 2 (2018).  
35 Wang Liming, Pochan Lifa Zhong De Ruogan Yinan Wenti Tantao [The Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Bill: An Analysis], 3 Fa Xue [Legal Science] 3, 11 (2005).  
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of unequivocally clarifying that a company placed in a voluntary 
bankruptcy reorganization procedure does not need to show the evidence 
of bankruptcy.36 Not surprisingly, in reality, this legal innovation under 
the EBL 2006 is simply disregarded by Chinese courts, since opening an 
in-court corporate reorganization procedure, as evidenced in the existing 
reorganizations, still needs to pass both the cash flow and balance sheet 
bankruptcy tests.37  
To improve the feasibility of a corporate rescue, the EBL 2006 Article 
73 allows the debtor, especially its board of directors, to manage the 
company’s assets and business affairs during the reorganization 
procedure, which means the debtor-in-possession model under the 
American Chapter 11 has been transplanted into the Chinese bankruptcy 
law.38 But, the Chinese version of debtor-in-possession is slightly different 
from that under Chapter 11.  
On the one hand, the Chinese debtor-in-possession model is a 
conditional one: Where a reorganization procedure is commenced, a 
bankruptcy administrator will be simultaneously appointed by the court to 
take control of the company; but the debtor is, under the EBL 2006 Article 
73, eligible to apply for debtor-in-possession afterwards, and if approved 
by the court, the bankruptcy administrator will return the control of the 
company to the debtor. The concern here is that Article 73 does not specify 
what conditions must be met when the court assesses the debtor-in-
possession application.39 It is equally true that if the debtor does not apply 
or if the court rejects the application, the company in reorganization will 
continue being controlled and managed by the court-appointed bankruptcy 
administrator. By contrast, the debtor-in-possession model under the US 
Chapter 11 is a default one and is routinely used.40  
On the other hand, if granted, the Chinese debtor-in-possession, 
compared with Chapter 11, seems to be more generous to the debtor: The 
debtor in possession under the EBL 2006 will be given the exclusive right 
of proposing a reorganization plan during the entire reorganization 
procedure;41 in comparison, its American counterpart’ monopoly on this 
is only limited during the first 120 days.42 Some argue that others parties 
could be allowed to propose a competing reorganization plan, which is 
 
36 11 USC § 301.  
37 See note 34 above at chapter 2 especially. 
38 Emily Lee, The Reorganisation Process under China’s Corporate Bankruptcy System, 
45 Int’l Law. 939, 942 (2011).  
39 Yongqing Ren, The ‘Control Model’ in Chinese Bankruptcy Reorganisation Law and 
Practice, 85 Am. Bankr. L. J. 177, 180 (2011).  
40 11 USC § 1104 and § 1107. 
41 The EBL 2006 Article 80.  
42 11 USC § 1121 (b).  
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subject to the vote of affected parties, and the current restriction under the 
EBL 2006, it seems, cannot be justified.43  
Although many argue that the use of debtor-in-possession should be 
the norm rather than the exception under the EBL 2006, especially given 
that it encourages an early rescue and can take advantage of the expertise 
of former managers, an empirical study suggests it is only applied in less 
than twenty per cent of the existing corporate reorganizations in China, 
and more importantly, the debtor-in-possession in action might have 
considerably deviated from the original design, since although the debtor-
in-possession is superficially installed, many key reorganization decisions 
are still made by court-appointed administrators.44  
Meanwhile, to facilitate more rescue outcomes, under the EBL 2006 
Article 87, in the event that a reorganization plan has been voted down by 
either the meeting of creditors or of shareholders or both, it may still be 
forcibly approved by the court if certain statutory conditions are satisfied, 
which means a Chapter 11-style cram down is also adopted by the EBL 
2006. Overall, the EBL 2006 appears to be considerably rescue-oriented.  
Second, the EBL 2006 evolves from the old law under which an 
enterprise bankruptcy procedure relies on a local government organized 
liquidation committee to manage the estate45 to an international ‘best 
practice’ whereby an insolvency administrator, who may be chosen from 
qualified lawyers or accountants, will be appointed to do the job, namely 
the new law embraces insolvency professionalism.46 Article 24 of the EBL 
2006 authorizes the China Supreme People’s Court to make the rules on 
the qualification and remuneration of insolvency practitioners in 
bankruptcy services.  
Creating an insolvency practitioner system in China by the EBL 2006 
is widely acclaimed domestically and internationally,47 since using 
qualified practitioners to manage companies in bankruptcy may 
considerably reduce government intervention so as to improve fairness 
and efficiency of the corporate bankruptcy system. But the problem is that 
the EBL 2006 Article 24 still retains government-organized liquidation 
committees, alongside qualified insolvency practitioners, to be appointed 
as bankruptcy administrators. Although the lawmakers’ intention, 
 
43 Rakhi I Patel, A Practical Evaluation of the People’s Republic of China’s 2007 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 10 U.C. Davis Bus. L. J. 109, 114 (2009).  
44 See note 34 above at chapter 2.  
45 The EBL 1986 Article 24, and the China Civil Procedure Law 1991 Article 201.  
46 The EBL 2006 Article 24.  
47 Charles D Booth, The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait is Finally Over, 
20 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 275, 292-5 (2008).  
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arguably, is to reserve such committees only for the bankruptcy of SOEs,48 
this has not been clearly written in the law, which may result in confusion 
or abuse.49  
Another problem of China’s new insolvency practitioner system is that 
it is the law court that can appoint a bankruptcy administrator, and that 
both debtor and creditor are not allowed to make a nomination, let alone 
an appointment. Given the poor record of the Chinese court system on 
judicial independence and on corruption,50 this may cast a shadow over 
whether bankruptcy administrators will prioritize the interest of creditors 
and over whether government intervention through law courts will persist 
in China’s corporate bankruptcies.51 But it seems fair to say that 
establishing the Chinese insolvency profession itself is a step forward in 
the right direction.  
But the major concern is that there are few cases for newly qualified 
insolvency practitioners in China to gain experience. Following the 
enactment of the EBL 2006, the China national number of corporate 
bankruptcy cases surprisingly declined from 4,755 in 2006 to 2059 in 
2014.52 Given the size of the Chinese economy, such numbers means that 
for the majority of newly qualified insolvency practitioners there is no 
bankruptcy case to practice. Without having real bankruptcy businesses, it 
is virtually impossible for this new profession to develop.  
Third, the EBL 2006 advocates collaboration on cross-border 
insolvencies, and its Article 5 uses the modified universality principle to 
deal with these challenges.53 This is somewhat due to the influence of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, which was 
published in 199754 and helped remind some Chinese liberal scholars who 
 
48 Jiang Qiangui, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochanfa Caoan Xiuga Qingkuang 
De Huibao [Report of the Revisions on the China Enterprise Bankruptcy Bill], 7 Quanguo 
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongbao [The Journal of the China People’s 
Congress Standing Committee] 579, 581 (2006).  
49 Li Shuguang & Wang Zuofa, Zhongguo Pochanfa Shishi Sannian Lai De Shizhen 
Fengxi: Lifa Yuqi Yu Sifa Shijian De Chaju Jiqi Jiejue Lujing [The Gap between 
Expectation of Legislation and Judicial Practice and its Resolution: Empirical Analysis of 
Bankruptcy Law’s Three-Years Implementation], 2 Zhengfa Luntan [The Journal of China 
University of Political Science and Law 58, 62 (2011).  
50 Ling Li, The ‘Production’ of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and 
Decision Making in a One-Party State, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry 847, 877 (2012).  
51 Roman Tomasic & Zinian Zhang, The Political Determinants of Corporate 
Reorganisation in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 125 (Christoph Antons 
ed., 2017).  
52 These figures are from the China Law Yearbook (2003-2014).  
53 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
2296 (2000).  
54 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
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joined the making of the EBL 2006 to be open-minded.55 In particular, this 
Article states that a corporate bankruptcy ruling by a Chinese court binds 
the company’s assets located domestically and abroad, and that equally a 
foreign bankruptcy ruling can also bind the company’s assets located in 
China but on the condition that such a ruling must be recognized by a 
Chinese court in the first place.56 This Article sets up some restrictions on 
recognition of a foreign bankruptcy judgement.  
Specifically, for an overseas bankruptcy judgement, the foreign 
country must have a judicial assistance treaty, bilateral or multilateral, 
with China, and if not, reciprocity on this must have been established; 
more important is that recognizing a foreign bankruptcy judgement cannot 
violate China’s fundamental legal principles, sovereignty, national 
security and public interests, in addition to the rights of domestic 
creditors.57 Some argue that the tone of this Article is considerably hostile, 
which might make recognition of foreign bankruptcy judgements a 
difficult task.58 It is also worth noting that China has not yet ascertained 
what fundamental legal principles, sovereignty, national security and 
public interests really mean, and such vagueness may lead to much 
uncertainty. With regard to reciprocity, the attitude of the Chinese court 
system seems to be that a foreign country must show goodwill at first by 
recognizing a Chinese law court ruling, and it appears that no Chinese 
court has, unilaterally and proactively, recognized a foreign court 
judgement so as to pave the way for establishing the reciprocity, although 
many call the Chinese courts to be forward-thinking and internationally 
friendly.  
As for the worldwide effect of China’s corporate bankruptcy rulings, 
many doubt that this is somewhat self-deceiving, since before being 
recognized by a foreign court, a Chinese bankruptcy ruling is meaningless 
on a foreign land; but supporters insist that it better than to say nothing.59 
Of course, a Chinese corporate bankruptcy ruling must be recognized by 




accessed 1 December 2017.  
55 Wang Weiguo, Zou Hailin and Li Yongjun, Pochan Fa Shinian [Ten Years of Drafting 
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law] (Seminar of the Civil and Commercial Law Centre, China 
University of Political Science and Law, 12 March 2004) 1.  
56 The EBL 2006 Article 5 Paragraph 1.  
57 The EBL 2006 Article 5 Paragraph 2.  
58 Steven J Arsenault, Leaping over the Great Wall: Examining Cross-Border Insolvency 
in China under the Chinese Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 21 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 
22 (2011). 
59 See note 53 above.  
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In practice, seeking the recognition of a foreign bankruptcy ruling in 
a Chinese court by relying on the EBL 2006 Article 5 seems to be a 
formidable task; after the EBL 2006 took effect since 2007, there was no 
reported recognition of foreign bankruptcy judgements. The recent two 
high profile cases, the bankruptcy rehabilitation of Hanjin Shipping 
Limited in 2016 taking place in South Korea60 and the administration of 
Lehman Brothers (Europe) Limited in 2008 opened in the UK,61 both of 
them having assets located in China, suggest that some, if not most, 
Chinese courts may not only ignore foreign bankruptcy rulings but also 
turn a blind eye to the recognition application by foreign bankruptcy 
office-holders.62 On the contrary, obtaining the judicial recognition of a 
Chinese bankruptcy ruling abroad is relatively easy, especially in some 
advanced jurisdictions that have adopted the UNCITRL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency; years ago, a corporate reorganization ruling 
from a Zhejiang court in China was recognized in the USA, serving a good 
example on this.63  
To sum up, at the first glance, the EBL 2006 looks very modern and 
seems to be similar with the bankruptcy legislations in many developed 
jurisdictions, but the greatest challenge is how to translate the law into 
practice, especially given China’s weak judicial system and the lack of the 
respect to the rule of law. Specifically, more problems can be identified by 
examining the use of the three major insolvency procedures in China since 
2007.  
IV. THE THREE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES 
UNDER THE EBL 2006 
 
As noted above, the EBL 2006 comprises three major corporate 
insolvency procedures, reorganization, composition and liquidation. 
Under the old EBL 1986, there is also a corporate reorganization 
 
60 Shi Jingxia & Huang Yuanyuan, Kuajie Pochan Zhong De Chenren Yu Jiuji Zhidu: Jiyu 
Hanjin Pochan An De Guancha Yu Fengxi [The Recognition and Relief in Cross-Border 
Insolvency – a Perspective from Hanjin Shipping Co.,] 2 Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Xuebao 
[Journal of Renmin University of China] 34, 35 (2017). 
61 Fenxiang Zhang, Cong Huaan Jijing Yu Leiman Ouzhou Jingrong Yanshen Chanping 
Touzi Hezuo An Kan Woguo Xiangguan Falu Zhidu De Wanshan [Lessons of Hua An v 
Lehman Brothers Europe], in Jingrong Fazhi Qiangyan [HERALD OF RULE OF LAW ON 
FINANCE] 79 (Yong Qing ed., 2011).  
62 Steven T Kargman, Emerging Economies and Cross-Border Regimes: Missing BRICs in 
the International Insolvency Architecture (Part II), 7 Insolvency and Restructuring 
International 6, 8-9 (2013).  
63 In Re Zhejiang Topoint Photovoltaic Co., Ltd [2015] United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of New Jersey 14-24549. 
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procedure, but it is too rudimentary to match its title;64 more strikingly, as 
noted before, the old reorganization procedure probably has never been 
used. In contrast, the reorganization procedure under the EBL 2006 is far 
more comprehensive and reflects many rescue mechanisms used in some 
advanced jurisdictions.65  
a. The Reorganization Procedure under the EBL 2006 
 
Reorganization applicants: Under the EBL 2006 Article 7, both the 
debtor and its creditors can file for the reorganization of the company 
before a local court; as noted above, in the case of a voluntary filing, under 
the EBL 2006 Article 2, even the company that is not bankrupt but is likely 
to be bankrupt can enter into reorganization at an early stage. Again, as 
mentioned before, this provision is virtually neglected in practice, 
although the legislative intention is well presented.  
For creditor applicants, the EBL 2006 Article 7 is clear: where the 
debtor company is unable to pay the debt which is due, the creditor can 
file for the bankruptcy reorganization of the debtor, which means passing 
a cash-flow bankruptcy test is sufficient for a creditor to bring a defaulting 
debtor into a bankruptcy reorganization procedure. The reality, however, 
is that this provision is also flouted by Chinese courts; instead, according 
to the existing reorganization filings, for a filing creditor, one of the 
conditions to commence a corporate reorganization procedure is to 
convince courts that both cash-flow and balance-sheet bankruptcy tests are 
satisfied.66 These make the entry of reorganization considerably difficult.  
To start a reorganization procedure, except a straightforward 
reorganization application filed either by the debtor or by its creditors, in 
the event of an involuntary liquidation procedure, the debtor or its 
shareholder(s) holding more than ten per cent of the company’s equity 
may, under the EBL 2006 Article 70, apply to the court to convert 
liquidation into reorganization. But the concern here is that if the company 
is already financially insolvent, in view of the fact that shareholders might 
have no substantial interest in the company, empowering shareholders to 
change the course of bankruptcy might be financially unjustifiable. More 
problematic is that whether to convert liquidation into reorganization 
should be ultimately decided by the court rather than by the creditors, and 
 
64 Rebecca Parry & Haizheng Zhang, China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives 
and Principles, 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113, 117 (2008).  
65 Steven J Arsenault, The Westernization of Chinese Bankruptcy: An Examination of 
China’s New Corporate Bankruptcy Law through the Lens of the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide of Insolvency Law, 27 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 45, 83 (2008).  
66 See note 34 above at chapter 2 especially. 
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this may rather undermine creditor protection in corporate bankruptcy 
procedures in China. But the key legislative message here is clear: the EBL 
2006 advocates the entry of reorganization.  
An early empirical study suggests that some sixty per cent of the 
surveyed corporate reorganization applicants under the new EBL 2006 are 
debtors and the rest of them are creditors; a conversion from liquidation 
into reorganization happens only in around five per cent of all 
reorganizations. But it is worth addressing that whoever is the 
reorganization applicant, without the political support of local 
government, opening an in-court corporate reorganization is highly 
unlikely.67 Local government not only plays a key role in deciding whether 
a reorganization procedure can be initiated but also takes control of 
judicial corporate reorganizations thereafter in one form or another.  
Control models of China’s corporate reorganizations: Whatever a 
reorganization, composition or liquidation procedure, under the EBL 2006 
Article 13, an insolvency practitioner, which is, in many cases, a qualified 
law or accounting firm, will be immediately appointed by the court as the 
bankruptcy administrator to take control of the company by replacing the 
previous management. But given that reorganization is aimed to 
rehabilitate rather than to liquidate companies in trouble, as noted before, 
following the beginning of a reorganization procedure, under the EBL 
2006 Article 73, the debtor, particularly the company’s management, can 
apply to the court for debtor-in-possession. It is equally true that the court-
appointed administrator will remain in office if the debtor does not apply 
for debtor-in-possession or if its application is rejected by the court. 
Hence, the control model of China’s corporate reorganizations seems to 
be a hybrid, embracing both the practitioner- and debtor-in-possession 
model widely used in the UK and the USA respectively.  
In reality, debtor-in-possession is not used as frequently as expected 
in China, since it is found that the conversion from practitioner- into 
debtor-in-possession is only approved in some eighteen per cent of the 
surveyed reorganizations.68 But the real challenge is that the current 
debtor-in-possession might have substantially deviated from what is 
originally intended in the EBL 2006, because although debtor-in-
possession is allowed, many key decisions are still made by court-
appointed administrators; for example, in many surveyed cases, debtor-in-
possession is somewhat used to merely retain the previous management to 
maintain the day-to-day operation of the company in reorganization, but 
some vital decisions, like choosing a company buyer, are actually made 
 
67 Huimiao Zhao, Reorganisation of Listed Companies with Chinese Characteristics, 91 
Am. Bankr. L. J. 87 (2017).  
68 See note 34 above at chapter 3. 
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by reorganization administrators. In this situation, the debtor occupies the 
driving seat under the debtor-in-possession model, but the substantial 
decision-making is in the hands of court-appointed administrators who are 
supposed to be supervisors only.  
What should be pointed out is that whether debtor-in-possession is 
used or not, local government, to a large extent, controls the reorganization 
of a local company in one way or another.69 For example, a liquidation 
committee might be formed by local government and is later appointed by 
the court as the reorganization administrator; sometimes, local 
government stays in the shadow by forming a political supporting 
committee to direct the course of the reorganization of a local large 
company, which might be a state-owned or even a private enterprise;70 so 
in real terms, arguably, China uses a kind of government-in-possession in 
its corporate reorganizations, which might be an entire departure from 
what is originally envisaged.71  
Corporate reorganization plans: Under the EBL 2006 Article 79, a 
reorganization plan must be proposed within six months after the company 
entered into reorganization, and a three-month extension can be granted 
by the court on request, if the court believes that it is reasonable. Using the 
word “reasonable” somewhat means that an extension can be given fully 
at the discretion of the court.  
But it seems to be a surprise that a reorganization plan can only be 
exclusively proposed by the administrator if debtor-in-possession is not in 
use, and that such a monopoly is offered to the debtor otherwise. Other 
parties, especially creditors, are not officially allowed to propose an 
alternative reorganization plan for a vote.  
But in practice, given that most China’s corporate reorganizations use 
company sale rescues, a reorganization plan is more or less the result of 
an intense bargaining between major creditors and company buyers;72 
namely the real reorganization plan makers are major creditors and 
company buyers instead of debtors or administrators; therefore, to a certain 
extent, it seems that it is not a matter of concern over who is officially 
eligible to propose a reorganization plan. Of course, ideally, when 
amending the EBL 2006, other key parties, including creditors and 
 
69 Ding Yan, Shangshi Gongsi Chongzhen Zhong Xingzhenquan Yunxing De Pianli Yu 
Jiaozhen [Government Intervention in the Reorganisations of Listed Companies in China], 
31 Faxue Luntan [Legal Forum] 122, 127 (2016).  
70 Changyin Han, The Practice of Reorganisation in China, 33 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
275, 281-2 (2016).  
71 See note 34 above at chapter 2.  
72 See note 34 above at chapter 6. 
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members, could be given the chance to make a competing rescue 
proposal.73  
Under the EBL 2006 Article 81, a reorganization plan may comprise 
two substantial elements, one to update the company’s business operation 
and the other to restructure the company’s debts. This Article does not 
mention how to deal with the equity of the company in a reorganization 
plan, and probably it leaves this gap for stakeholders to fill in practice. 
Bearing in mind the prevalent company sale reorganizations in China, the 
content of most reorganization plans is on how to restructure the 
company’s debts, and usually there is little ink spilled on how to 
reorganize the company’s business; probably revitalizing the company’s 
business is better left for company buyers to sort out subsequent to the 
judicial reorganization procedure.  
A reorganization plan, under the EBL 2006 Articles 86 and 87, will 
not take effect unless it successfully goes through the two stages, first a 
vote by the creditors and second an approval by the court. For the voting 
purpose, under the EBL 2006 Article 82, creditors are separated into four 
classes, the secured, employee, tax, and ordinary unsecured creditors, to 
vote on the proposed reorganization plan; the plan, a reorganization 
proposal, is passed if it is voted for by over half of the attending creditors 
holding over two-thirds of the claims in each class. Under the EBL 2006 
Article 86, a reorganization plan that has been voted in favor by all classes 
of creditors may be submitted to the court for confirmation/approval; the 
court will approve the voted plan if it believes that the plan generally 
conforms to the EBL 2006; this Article does not say which articles or 
provisions of the EBL 2006 should be specifically complied with. In 
practice, all reorganization plans that are voted for by creditors are 
smoothly approved by the courts.  
The contentious issue here might be that a reorganization plan that 
affects the equity of shareholders must, under the EBL 2006 Article 85, 
also be voted by shareholders.74 Given the insolvency of most companies 
in reorganization, pursuant to Article 85, this means cancelling the 
previous equity must be agreed by the equity-holders. Professor Li 
Shuguang argues that if the company is financially insolvent, the vote of 
shareholders is advisory only and is not legally binding on the proposed 
 
73 Chi Weihong, Lun Chongzhen Jihua De Zhiding [Making Corporate Reorganisation 
Proposals under the China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of 2006], 3 Jiaoda Faxue [SJTU 
Law Review] 122, 131 (2017).  
74 Tang Weijian, Woguo Pochanfa Caoan Zai Chongzhen Chengxu Shiji Shang De Ruogan 
Zengyi Wenti Zhi Wojian [Several Problems of the Proposed Bill of Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law on Reorganisation], 2 Faxue Jia [Jurists] 33, 36 (2005). 
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reorganization plan;75 but the EBL 2006 is rather strict, requiring that the 
consensus of shareholders is needed. To solve potential deadlocks, if a 
reorganization plan failed in winning the vote of any class of creditors or 
the class of shareholders or both, under the EBL 2006 Article 87, it can 
still be submitted to the court for a forcible approval on the condition that 
the statutory tests are passed, which means, as noted before, that cram-
down approvals are applicable under the EBL 2006.  
Unlike under the USA Chapter 11 where cram-down mainly serves as 
a legal leverage to facilitate negotiations between stakeholders, the 
Chinese cram-down approval is often used to legitimize corporate 
reorganization plans that have been voted down by either creditors or 
shareholders or both; a study shows that cram-down approvals are used in 
around one quarter of the surveyed Chinese corporate reorganizations.76  
Overall, reorganization is intended to be the primary corporate rescue 
procedure in China, though the harsh reality is that it is not widely 
available for troubled businesses to seek survival. An alternative rescue 
procedure is composition under the same EBL 2006.  
b. The Composition Procedure under the EBL 2006 
 
In theory, like the reorganization procedure embedded in the EBL 
2006 Chapter 8, composition under Chapter 9 is also a rescue procedure.77 
If a settlement can be reached between the debtor and its creditors, the 
company can avoid being liquidated and survives the bankruptcy crisis.78 
Traditionally, composition is always favored by China’s successive 
bankruptcy statutes, including the 1935 and 1986 bankruptcy laws. 
Compared with reorganization, which was applied, between 2007 and 
2015, for some 700 companies,79 composition is quite rarely used, since 
there are, during the same period, less than ten composition cases a year 
identified in China as a whole.80  
Composition applicants: Under the EBL 2006 Article 95, a debtor may 
straightforwardly apply to the court to enter into a bankruptcy composition 
 
75 Li Shuguang, Zhongguo Xing Pochan Fa De Jige Zenyi Dian [Some Issues on New 
Bankruptcy Law], 6 Zhongguo Falu [China Law] 17, 19 (2006). 
76 See note 34 above at chapter 6. 
77 Andrew Godwin, Corporate Rescue in Asia – Trends and Challenges, 34 Sydney L. Rev. 
163, 180 (2012).  
78 Qinyu Zhang, Composition in Enterprises Bankruptcy Law of China: Crises, Reflection 
and Reshaping, 91 Am. Bankr. L. J. 55, 78 (2017). 
79 See note 34 above at chapter 2. 
80 These figures are collected by the author by examining the corporate bankruptcy 
advertisements published on the China People’s Court Daily, a Chinese version of the law 
gazette.  
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procedure, and in the event of an existing liquidation, voluntary and 
involuntary, the debtor may ask the court to convert it into composition; 
in both situations, the debtor must accompany its application with a 
composition plan/proposal. But whether a composition procedure can be 
formally commenced depends on whether the court agrees with the 
debtor’s application; the EBL 2006 Article 96 stipulates that if the court 
believes the application is in line with this law, again, without elaborating 
which provisions must be specifically conformed to, a court order may be 
issued to officially open a composition procedure.81 
Logically, this equally means that if the court thinks the debtor’s 
composition application does not comply with the EBL 2006 in general, 
the debtor’s effort to use this procedure for bankruptcy relief will be 
rejected. To some extent, it is of opinion of the court whether a corporate 
bankruptcy composition procedure can be entered into. Given the widely 
perceived judicial irresponsibility of Chinese courts,82 this is perhaps one 
of the major reasons why this bankruptcy procedure is virtually shelved to 
the detriment of the China business communities.83 Except debtors, no 
other parties, including creditors or shareholders, can initiate a corporate 
composition procedure.  
With the forty-six composition cases between 2007 and 2015 
surveyed, it is found that thirty-six (78%) of them were converted from 
liquidations, i.e., these liquidations ended happily, since a composition 
plan was agreed by the debtor and its creditors prior to the completion of 
liquidations, so that liquidation was avoided. The remaining ten cases 
(22%) were filed originally as the composition procedure, which 
somewhat suggests that directly commencing a composition procedure 
might be more difficult.  
Control in compositions: Although it is only the debtor who can 
propose a composition plan, the control of the company’s assets and 
business affairs is, rather strangely, still in the hands of the court-appointed 
administrator. In the event that composition has been transformed from 
liquidation, the administrator previously appointed to manage the estate in 
the liquidation procedure will remain in office as the party in charge; for a 
directly-filed composition, under the EBL 2006 Article 13, the court will 
appoint a bankruptcy administrator to take control. It seems that, unlike in 
 
81 Yujia Jiang, The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: A Comparative 
Study of US and Chinese Bankruptcy Law, (2014) 34 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 559, 565.  
82 Terence C Halliday & Bruce G Carruthers, ‘Institutional Lessons from Insolvency 
Reforms in East Asia’ (The Fourth Forum on Asian Insolvency Law Reform 2004, 2-5 
November 2004, New Delhi, India) 23.  
83 Zhang Qinyu, Pochan Hejie Zhi Shang [The Failure of the Bankruptcy Composition 
Regime under the EBL 2006], 1 Huadong Zhenfa Daxue Xuebao [Journal of East China 
University of Political Science and Law] 150, 151 (2014).  
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reorganization, debtor-in-possession is not available in a composition 
procedure.  
It appears, however, paradoxical that, under the EBL 2006 Articles 13 
and 95, on the one hand, the court-appointed administrator stays at the 
helm of the composition procedure, but that on the other, the composition 
plan, the key document in the procedure, can only be proposed by the 
debtor. Proposing a composition plan seems to be a substantial right in 
nature, which is not bestowed to the administrator, the party in charge. But 
in reality, given that most compositions are updated from liquidations, 
composition plans are more likely to be prepared by parties other than 
debtors instead. To clear up this doubt, fifteen compositions taking place 
between 2013 and 2015 are studied by searching more detailed 
information from publicly available sources, most of them media reports 
from China; there are five cases whose relevant information could be 
obtained.  
Out of these five compositions, four of them were actually carried out 
as company sales, i.e., the creditors and the company buyer used a 
composition plan to conclude a sale under which the company as a going 
concern was sold to the buyer. Since in these four cases, the debtor behind 
which were the shareholders lost everything in the composition procedure, 
it was highly unlikely for the composition plan to have been proposed 
voluntarily. The most plausible explanation is that these composition plans 
were made by a coalition of the administrator, the major creditors and the 
company buyer. The debtor’s right in proposing a composition plan might 
be significantly marginalized in reality.  
In the remaining one case, in which the state-owned company, Puyang 
Plastics Limited, Henan Province, successfully used the bankruptcy 
composition procedure to solve its bankruptcy trouble in 2013, with the 
powerful support from the company’s shareholder, a local government 
state-asset management department, the creditors accepted a debt 
reduction by voting for the composition plan.84 Essentially, in this case, it 
was the local government that made the composition plan. Therefore, it 
seems safe to say that, concerning the control model, debtors are in a very 
weak position in composition procedures, mainly because it is unrealistic 
to translate debtors’ right in proposing composition plans in books into the 
right in action.  
Composition plans: A composition plan which does not bind secured 
creditors must, under the EBL 2006 Article 97, pass the vote of the 
unsecured creditors. It is unclear whether unsecured creditors should be, 
like in reorganization under the EBL 2006 Article 82, divided into three 
 
84 Puyang Human Resources Net, ‘The Puyang Municipal Government Reforms State-
Owned Companies through Injecting Capital’ (20 April 2015, Puyang Henan China) 1.  
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classes as employee, tax and ordinary unsecured creditors to vote on a 
composition plan. But bearing in mind that most composition plans fully 
honor employee and tax authority claims, perhaps, only ordinary 
unsecured creditors are to vote.  
It is worth noting that under the EBL 2006 Article 96, as stated above, 
a composition plan does not bind secured creditors, and that this Article 
makes it crystal clear that a secured creditor is exempt from the general 
moratorium, which means that in a composition procedure, a secured 
creditor can realize encumbered assets without regard to the rescue 
procedure. Some comment that this would make composition less 
effective in rescuing troubled companies.85 However, this concern might 
be considerably alleviated in real cases, since most compositions are 
transferred from liquidations in which a previous general moratorium 
automatically imposed in liquidation has already prohibited the 
foreclosure of securities.86  
Similar to a reorganization plan, a composition plan also needs to go 
through two stages before taking effect. First, under the EBL 2006 Article 
97, it must be voted in favor by over half of attending unsecured creditors 
holding over two-thirds of the entire unsecured claims; failing in winning 
the vote of unsecured creditors, the composition effort is doomed, and, 
under the EBL 2006 Article 99, will be converted into liquidation. Having 
gained the consent from the unsecured creditors, under Article 98, the 
passed composition plan must be ultimately recognized or approved by the 
court; again, this Article does not say how the court will assess the voted 
composition plan before giving the blessing.  
An approved composition plan must be executed by the debtor 
company under the EBL 2006 Article 102, which essentially means that 
the debtor will pay the unsecured creditors as promised in the composition 
plan. In the light of the prevalence of company sale compositions, the post-
composition debtor might have been largely transformed, since the 
rehabilitated debtor is usually under the new ownership of the company 
buyer. Under the EBL 2006 Article 104, in the event that the debtor is 
unable to, or does not, fulfil its obligations under the approved 
composition plan, the court may, at the request of composition creditors, 
terminate the execution of the composition plan and directs it into 
liquidation straightforwardly; this did happen.87  
 
85 See note 78 above.  
86 The EBL 2006 Article 19.  
87 Shuyang County People’s Court,  Gonggao [Public Notice on the Termination of the 
Composition Procedure of Aufama Vitamin Limited], Renmin Fayuan Bao [The China 
People’s Court Daily] Oct. 31, 2015, 3.  
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To sum up, composition is scarcely used in practice, mainly because 
of the judicial inactivity; most existing compositions are converted from 
liquidations. Presumably, in these liquidations, if a serious buyer emerges, 
converting liquidation into composition would be an effective way to 
sustain the company as a legal entity, since liquidation exclusively leads 
to the dissolution of the company. Maintaining the debtor company as a 
legal entity makes sense in China, for most business licenses will be 
revoked by regulators if the company as a legal person is dissolved.88 In 
contrast with reorganizations and compositions, liquidation is undoubtedly 
the most used bankruptcy procedure in China.  
c. The Liquidation Procedure under the EBL 2006 
 
It seems to be an irony that liquidation, the paramount bankruptcy 
procedure by number at least, is arranged at the third place in the 
bankruptcy choice ladder under the EBL 2006. Nevertheless, its 
significance cannot be simply judged over its position in the statutory 
order. Between 2007 and 2015, an eight-year period, there were some 
27,345 corporate bankruptcy cases dealt with in China as a whole, 26,371 
(96%) of them liquidations.89  
Liquidation applicants: under the EBL 2006 Article 10, both the 
debtor and its creditor, in theory, can file to the local court to open a 
liquidation procedure; a single creditor could trigger a liquidation against 
the debtor, whereas in the USA, usually there should be at least three 
creditors acting jointly to bring a debtor into a liquidation procedure.90 In 
contrast to the UK insolvency law under which a wide range of parties, 
including the debtor, its directors, creditors and contributories, can initiate 
a liquidation case,91 such a right in China is only reserved for the debtor 
and its creditors.  
For a voluntary liquidation filing, under the EBL 2006 Articles 2 and 
7, the debtor must present the evidence to pass both the cash-flow and 
balance-sheet bankruptcy tests. In practice, to meet this requirement, the 
company usually provides an audited financial report to convince the 
court. In contrast, in the USA, a voluntary liquidation application does not 
need to show the evidence of the company’s insolvency at all.92 The 
concept of bankruptcy relief has not yet been established in China.  
 
88 Xianchu Zhang & Charles D Booth, Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market 
Economy: The Shenzhen Experience, 15 Colum. J. Asian L. 1, 23 (2001).  
89 The number of annual corporate bankruptcies is from the China Annual Law Year Books 
and the China Supreme People’s Court Annual Reports.  
90 11 USC § 303 (a). 
91 Insolvency Act 1986 s 124.  
92 11 USC § 301.  
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With respect to an involuntary liquidation application, it looks easier, 
since the EBL 2006 Article 7 only requires the filing creditor to prove the 
company’s cash-flow bankruptcy, i.e., the debtor is unable to pay the debt 
that is due. In reality, however, it can be frequently identified that many 
Chinese courts still require filing creditors to prove that the debtor 
company is bankrupt by both the cash-flow and balance-sheet test.93 
Although on the fact of it, a liquidation procedure can be initiated very 
conveniently by relying on the aforementioned Articles, the law in action 
is, to a large extent, different. Most, if not all, Chinese courts turn a blind 
eye to corporate liquidation filings; even some local courts, for example, 
have not accepted one single corporate liquidation during the first eight-
year period following the implementation of the EBL 2006 since 2007.94 
And one study estimates that in China, only less than one per cent of 
bankrupt companies that are supposed to be placed in judicial bankruptcy 
procedures could access the formal liquidation procedure to exit the 
market.95  
To be realistic, to initiate a corporate liquidation procedure, as well as 
reorganization and composition, in China, the political support from local 
government is the key condition prior to the local court considering the 
application. Even it is not an exaggeration to say that the whole judicial 
system does not respond to businesses on bankruptcy issues; rather local 
courts only open liquidation procedures at the request of local 
government.96 Therefore, to a great extent, local government is the only 
eligible party to initiate a judicial company liquidation procedure mainly 
for political reasons; it sounds rather abnormal, but it is the reality in the 
country.97  
Control of Liquidations: Under the EBL 2006 Articles 13 and 25, a 
bankruptcy administrator, the liquidator, will be immediately installed by 
the court to take possession of the company’s properties and business 
 
93 The Shenzhen Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Gonggao [The Public Notice on 
the Liquidation of Shenzhen Bao’an Bicycle Limited], Renmin Fayuan Bao [The China 
People’s Court Daily] Oct. 1, 2014, 3. 
94 The Shandong Province Supreme People’s Court, Quanshen Fayuan Pochan Anjian 
Taishi Fengxi Ji Duice Jiangyi [Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in Shandong Province: Trend 
and Suggestions], 3 Shandong Shenpan [Shandong Justice] 17, 18 (2015).  
95 Zinian Zhang & Roman Tomasic, Corporate Reorganisation Reform in China: Findings 
from an Empirical Study in Zhejiang, 11 Asian J. Comp. L. 58, 68 (2016).  
96 The China Supreme People’s Court, Guanyu Zhenque Shenli Qiye Pochan Anjian Wei 
Weihu Shichang Jingji Chixu Tigong Sifa Baozhang Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Several 
Suggestions of Dealing with Company Bankruptcies to Strengthen Chinese Market 
Economy], 36, Jun. 12, 2009, 8.  
97 The People’s Bank of China and the Wenzhou Municipal Government, ‘The 
Government’s Role in Corporate Bankruptcies’ (Working Paper of Tsinghua University, 
23 June 2016) 9-10.  
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affairs; in fact, the company as a whole will be managed by the 
administrator in the entire course of liquidation. However, the liquidation 
administrator must be heavily supervised by the court. For example, under 
the EBL 2006 Article 26, to decide whether the company’s business 
operation should be terminated, the administrator must get the permission 
from the court; such supervision seems unjustifiable, for even some judges 
lament that whether to keep the company’s business operation on is a 
commercial, rather than legal, assessment, and that judges are not 
professionally fit to do this job.98  
Meanwhile, under the EBL 2006 Article 69, before disposing of the 
company’s substantial assets, including, among others, land, buildings, 
and intellectual properties, the administrator must get the advance 
permission either from the court or from the creditors committee; bearing 
in mind the creditors committee is rarely formed,99 asking for the 
permission from the court is the condition before the administrator taking 
action to deal with the company’s key assets. This leads to some 
commenting that bankruptcy administrators in China somewhat act as the 
assistants of judges in corporate liquidations.100 Hence, corporate 
liquidations in China are heavily court-controlled in real terms.  
Value Distribution in Liquidations: After realizing the company’s 
assets, the bankruptcy administrator, under the EBL 2006 Article 115, 
must prepare a value distribution plan, which is to be voted at the meeting 
of creditors and needs to be confirmed by the court afterwards. Pursuant 
to the EBL 2006 Article 64, the value distribution plan is passed if it is 
voted in favor by over half of attending creditors in number whose claims 
represent over half of the unsecured debts in value. Compared with the 
passage of a corporate reorganization plan that needs the support of 
creditors over half in number and over two-thirds in claims,101 the 
threshold of passing a liquidation value distribution plan seems to be easier 
to cross.  
Concerning the priority of distributing the value of the company 
between various parties, the EBL 2006 Article 113 creates a payment 
hierarchy according to which after meeting liquidation costs, including the 
 
98 The Second Civil Chamber of Pujiang County People’s Court, Zhejiang Province, 
‘Sustain Economic Growth and Maintain Social Stability: Experience in Dealing with 
Corporate Bankruptcies in Pujiang’ (Working paper prepared by the Pujiang Court in an 
internal seminar organized by the Zhejiang Province Supreme People’s Court) (on file with 
author) 89.  
99 Yu Lin, Pochan Chenxu Zhong Guanli Ren Zhize Luxing De Qianghua Yu Jiangdu 
Wanshan [Supervision of Corporate Bankruptcy Administrators in China], 15 Falu Shiyun 
[Journal of Law Application] 37, 45 (2017).  
100 Jingheng Law Firm, ‘Eight Lawyers from Jingheng Attended the Insolvency 
Practitioner Conference’ (Hangzhou Zhejiang China, 18 September 2011) 1.  
101 The EBL 2006 Article 84.  
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administrator’s fees, liquidation expenses and post-liquidation debts, the 
value of the company goes to paying employees at first, followed by tax 
claims and, in the case of a surplus, pays ordinary unsecured creditors, and 
if any of these three classes of unsecured creditors could not be paid in 
full, pari passu applies. The question here is that, in view of the fact how 
to distribute the value of a company in liquidation has been clearly 
regulated by the law, why the value distribution plan still needs the 
approval, a second assessment, of creditors. In the UK, the liquidator only 
needs to report the value distribution issues to the meeting of creditors, 
and no vote of creditors on this is required;102 in the USA, a Chapter 7 
liquidation trustee is to distribute the value of the estate to creditors under 
the law, and no vote of creditors is held.103 The absurdity of China’s EBL 
2006 on this should be rethought.  
The most contentious over value distribution appears to be the priority 
between employees and secured creditors in China.104 Under the EBL 
2006 Articles 109 and 113, it is a general principle for secured assets to be 
sold to meet secured claims first, but the EBL 2006 Article 132 makes an 
exception that employee claims generated before the EBL 2006 taking 
effect, namely, 1st June 2007, should be paid ahead of secured creditors. 
Some historic context should be explained here for a better understanding.  
Under the old EBL 1986 Article 28, secured creditors are paid from 
realizing secured assets and are technically ranked before employees; but 
this principle is later undermined by an executive notice entitled ‘The 
Policies on the Bankruptcy of SOEs in the Selected Cities’ issued by the 
China State Council, the Chinese central government, in 1994,105 which 
reverses the statutory priority between secured creditors and employees in 
the bankruptcies of SOEs that are located in eighteen cities designated by 
the State Council as the national SOE bankruptcy experimental areas. 
Strictly speaking, the priority of securities is still retained in the 
bankruptcy of SOEs that are not from these selected eighteen cities; of 
course, in the bankruptcy of private companies, securities must be 
absolutely respected, at least in theory. 
Unfortunately, the 1994 notice was frequently abused by local 
governments to use the money of secured creditors, almost all of them 
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central-government-owned banks, to resettle the employees of troubled 
local SOEs, whether these SOEs are from the eighteen chosen cities or 
not.106 Five years later, in 1999, the Chinese central government 
succumbed to the demands of local governments, in a new policy notice, 
allowing employee claims to be paid before securities in the bankruptcy 
of all SOEs, wherever they are from.107 The priority of employees over 
secured creditors is widely practiced in the bankruptcy of SOEs in China, 
but is unlawful, since it is against both the spirit and letters of the EBL 
1986, and inevitably it invited much criticism.108  
The EBL 2006 seems to have somewhat legalized and expanded such 
a priority on two fronts, however. First, its Article 133 elevates and 
reaffirms the successive policies on the bankruptcy of SOEs issued by the 
China State Council, maintaining that the bankruptcy of SOEs is subject 
to the policies issued by the State Council, which solves the legal conflict 
between the old EBL 1986 and the aforementioned executive notices. In 
substance, this Article reassures that in the bankruptcy of SOEs, the 
priority of employees over secured creditors is retained and continues to 
apply, before and after the promulgation of the EBL 2006. Second, rather 
than exclusively prioritizing employees over secured creditors in the 
bankruptcy of SOEs under the old regulations, the EBL 2006 Article 132 
expands such a priority to the bankruptcy of all non-SOE enterprises, but 
only favors the employee claims accumulated before the EBL 2006 came 
into force on 1 June 2017.  
Obviously, it is a political concession made during the making of the 
EBL 2006.109 But it is worth noting that respecting securities in corporate 
bankruptcies in China is a norm, and in only exceptional occasions, 
securities are to give way to employees.  
After using the value generated from selling the company’s assets, 
tangible and intangible, to pay creditors, the liquidation administrator will 
inform the company registration authorities to remove the company from 
the official company list. But in practice, this is not easy. The China Tax 
Management Law 2001 Article 16 requires that a company could not be 
deregistered if there is unpaid tax. Given that in many company 
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bankruptcies, tax authorities could not be fully repaid; usually the 
company registration authority simply refuses to delete the company’s 
name from the official list.110  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Although China enacted much-awaited EBL 2006, its implementation 
remains considerably weak. Only a meagre proportion of bankrupt 
companies could access bankruptcy procedures under the new law to exit 
the market. In spite of the creation of the new rescue-friendly 
reorganization procedure in this law, the overwhelming majority of 
existing bankruptcies are liquidations. Another rescue procedure, 
composition, is almost forgotten in judicial practice, since only less than 
fifty cases between 2007 and 2015 are identified.  
In general, regarding the legislative objective in promoting a corporate 
rescue culture in China, apparently, given that the new rescue procedure 
is only occasionally used at the request of local government to rehabilitate 
large local companies and that most pro-rescue legislative innovations are 
not really used, it is perhaps difficult to say that this objective has been 
achieved. Meanwhile, in view of a small number of bankruptcy cases 
handled in China annually, there are indeed few cases for the newly 
qualified insolvency practitioners to practice and to improve their skills 
and expertise, so that the mission of establishing a well-functioning 
insolvency profession also cannot be said a success. In addition, the goal 
of facilitating international cooperation on cross-border corporate 
insolvencies seems to be a total failure, as Chinese law courts have not yet 
relied on the new recognition procedure to assist any foreign insolvency 
office holders. The implementation of the EBL 2006 in the past ten years 
is largely a fiasco.  
Arguably, as for the way forward, the current court-centered 
bankruptcy system should be overhauled, and a market-based bankruptcy 
regime, mainly relying on the work of insolvency practitioners, including 
lawyers and accountants, might be the future if China does need an 
effective bankruptcy system. It should be addressed that the Chinese ruling 
class, including governments and courts, does not need a corporate 
bankruptcy law, but the China business community comprising creditors 
and debtors desperately crave for an effective and efficient bankruptcy law 
so as to either seek fairness or look for relief.  
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At the moment, the only hope would be that the international 
communities, especially the USA and the EU, keep on imposing pressure 
on China for legal reform; expecting China’s internal forces to reform its 
legal system in general and the bankruptcy system in particular, it seems, 
is more likely to be met with disappointment.  
 
